Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: There is no SWF which satis es U, IIA and ND.
PROOF: The proof consists of two steps: in the rst, I prove that if there is a disagreement o n any given pairwise comparison, the SWF must agree with the majority. In the second step, I prove that this property implies the intransitivity of the SWF. Thus, the two steps jointly show that the axioms are inconsistent.
To prove the Theorem, extensive use will be made of the following table: Table 1 where each column in the table describes a particular ranking for the three individuals in a given pairwise comparison: the rst eight columns refer to x versus y, columns 9 to 16 refer to y versus z, the last eight columns refer to z versus x. The rst three rows denote a's, b's and c's preferences, and the last two s o c i e t y's preferences. In the sequel, when I refer to a given column of the table, I will refer to a particular pro le of the individuals' preference on a given comparison.
A few things are worth noting about this table: rst, any given linear preference pro le for the three individuals in this society can be described by appropriately picking one column from each pairwise comparison: for example, columns (5,11,18) describe y a z a x, z b x b y and x c y c z. H o wever, note that only speci c combinations of columns will de ne rational preference pro les: for example, columns (1,9,23) violate the transitivity o f c's preferences. It may be visually appealing to show students that the only intransitive linear preference pro les are those which result in ( ) o r ( ). Second, note that, by IIA, knowing what social preference is under each of these 24 columns delivers a complete description of the SWF. Third, by Unrestricted Domain and Rationality, f o r a n y rational preference pro le we decide to pick, there must correspond rational social preferences. Finally, note that some columns are already lled by i n voking U. These are indicated in the fourth row of the table.
Step 1: Notice that in all the columns of the table which are not lled by U , w e h a ve a con ict between a majority o f t wo individuals and a single dissenter. I rst show that in the presence of such con ict, society cannot be indi erent. Secondly I show that if society sides with the single dissenting individual in a given case of disagreement, then this individual must be a dictator. Given that dictatorship is ruled out by axiom, this proves the step.
Take a n y case of disagreement of individual preferences on a given comparison, say, without loss of generality, column 2 in the table. Consider two alternative preference pro les: i) columns (2,9,23) and ii) columns (2, 16, 23) . By IIA, social preference in the (x-y) and (z-x) comparisons must be the same in both cases. If in column 23 we h a ve x s z, then y s x s z in the rst case and z s x s y in the second. If x s z, transitivity forces x s y. I f z s x, transitivity f o r c e s y s x. Therefore, in column 2 we m ust have either x s y or y s x (i.e. x cannot be socially indi erent t o y).
Suppose then that y s x. Consider the preference pro les (2, 16, 19) , (2, 16, 21) and (2, 16, 23) . By assumption, y s x, and by U , z s y. T h us, by transitivity, z s x in columns 19, 21 and 23 of row 5. Using the same reasoning, we c hoose the preference pro les: i) (2,11,24), (2,13,24), (2, 15, 24) ii) (1, 15, 18) , (1, 15, 20) , (1, 15, 22) iii) (1,10,23), (1, 12, 23) , (1,14,23) iv) (3, 16, 18) , (5, 16, 18) , (7, 16, 18) v) (4,9,23), (6, 9, 23) to ll the other entries in that row. 1 But rows 4 and 5 jointly imply that social preference is identical to row 3 , t h a t i s , c is a dictator, and the step is proved. 2 Step 2: J u s t t a k e a n ỳ v oting paradox' preference pro le, say (5, 11, 18) , and use step 1 to get x s y s z s x, which violates transitivity. This concludes the proof of the Theorem for the case of three individuals.
I suspect that many teachers may wish to stop right here, feeling that they have already conveyed the essence of Arrow's argument. However, before turning to the general case of n 3 individuals, we pause here to note that Arrow's Theorem works also for the simpler case of two individuals, by considering the subtable of table 1 made of columns (1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24) . Individuals a and b have the same preferences in that subtable, and thus may be considered as a single individual, and a simpli ed step 1 su ces to prove the Theorem. 3 It turns out that the above proof can be easily extended to the general case of n 3 individuals.
I will again proceed in two steps: in the rst, I establish that whenever there is a situation such that, on a given pairwise comparison, one single individual has dissenting preferences from the other n ; 1 individuals, the SWF must agree w i t h t h e n ; 1 individuals. The second step will show that this leads to a contradiction.
Step 1*: Without loss of generality, assume that n wins on a pairwise comparison where she is unanimously opposed by all the other n ; 1 individuals: for example, assume that y n x, x i y, i = 1 n ; 1, and y s x. Consider then an arbitrary pro le of preferences on a given arbitrary pairwise comparison. Given individual n, partition the remaining n;1 individuals into two groups, call them A and B, such that everybody in A has the same preference as the nth individual, and everybody in B has a dissenting preference. 4 Let individual n play the role of c, individuals in A play the role of a, and individuals in B play the role of b in the proof of step 1 of the previous section. Then by translating the chosen arbitrary pro le into table 1 above, and following the appropriate sequence of preference pro les, it follows that if she wins under column 2, she must also win in this arbitrary case. This clearly contradicts ND, and the step is proved.
Step 2*: Consider the following sequence of preference pro les:
1 Alternatively, r o w 5 could be lled in two steps: the rst to demonstrate that if c wins on a given pairwise comparison when she is unanimously opposed by the other two individuals, she will always win in all instances where she is unanimously opposed (e.g. using pro les (2,16,23), (2, 15, 24) , (1, 15, 18) , (1,10,23), (7, 16, 18) ) the second to demonstrate that additional support by another individual does not reduce her power (e.g. using pro les (2,16,19), (2,16,21), (2,11,24), (2,13,24), (1, 15, 20) , (1, 15, 22) , (1, 12, 23) , (1, 14, 23) , (3,16,18), (5,16,18) , (4,9,23), (6,9,23)). In this second step, it may b e w orth noting that each t i m e w e e n ter a new social preference in row 5 , a's and b's rational preferences in that column could be changed at will, including the possibility of indi erence. Thus this is where it is convenient to relax the linearity assumption, if desired. Table 2 Consider the rst preference pro le, de ned by the rst 3 columns in the table. By step 1*, x s y and y s z. T h us, x s z. But this implies that in the (z-x) comparison the SWF agrees with the rst n ; 2 individuals when they are opposed by the last 2. Consider then the next preference pro le, de ned by columns 4, 5 and 6 in the table. By IIA, x s z, and by step 1*, y s x. T h us, y s z, that is, in the (y-z) comparison the SWF agrees with the rst n ; 3 individuals when they are opposed by the last 3. It is obvious then that we can continue in this fashion until we e v entually arrive at a preference pro le such as the one de ned by the last 3 columns of the table, where on a g i v en pairwise comparison, say the (z-x), the SWF agrees with the rst 2 individuals when they are opposed by the last n ; 2. Thus, under this preference pro le we h a ve x s z but z s y and y s x by step 1*, a contradiction of transitivity. This concludes the proof the Theorem.
The reader may h a ve realized that the last step of this proof is actually based on an induction argument. According to the level of mathematical sophistication of the audience, this can be made explicit, or left implicit as above.
Step 2* can be proven alternatively by using Barber a's (1980) pivotal voter idea: one individual is pivotal for a given pairwise comparison at a preference pro le if she can change the social preference by c hanging her preference.
Consider the following sequence of preference pro les on a given pairwise comparison, say the (x-y)'s: Table 3 where the rst and the last two elements of the last row are lled by i n voking U and step 1*. Going from the rst column to the last, consider the rst occurrence where y s x. Note than that in the column immediately preceding it x s y, but only one individual has changed her preferences. Let this individual be the kth. Given individual k, partition the remaining n ; 1 individuals into two groups, call them A and B, s u c h that A contains the rst k ;1 individuals and B contains the last n ; k. Let individual k play the role of c, individuals in A play the role of a, and individuals in B play the role of b in table 1. Note that in column 3 we h a ve x s y while in column 4 y s x because c is pivotal in this pairwise comparison. Consider then the preference pro le (3,9,22). x s y and y s z imply x s z in column 22. But using the preference pro le (4, 15, 22) we g e t y s x and x s z but y s z by step 1*, contradicting the transitivity of the SWF.
